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I. INTRODUCTION

The Eastman Kodak Company (Kodak) was one of the great in-

dustrial giants of the twentieth century. Headquartered in Rochester,
New York, Kodak employed not only highly paid executives and engineers but also thousands of blue-collar workers.' In fact, Kodak was
credited with creating "two generations of middle-class wealth in
Rochester."2 One former Rochester resident explained, "If you lived in
Rochester and worked for Kodak, the expectation was that you would
stay there until retirement, and receive a handsome pension thereafter." 3 Even though the working class employees were employed at
will,4 this expectation of loyalty undoubtedly inspired trust between
1. Neil Irwin, To UnderstandRising Inequality, Consider the Janitorsat Two Top Companies, Then and Now, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Sept. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/
03/upshot/to-understand-rising-inequality-consider-the-janitors-at-two-top-companies-thenand-now.html.
2. Id.
3. David DiSalvo, The Fall of Kodak: A Tale of Disruptive Technology and Bad Business, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2011, 2:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddisalvo/2011/
10/02/what-i-saw-as-kodak-crumbled/ #553c89697dfl [https://perma.cc/SGP6-5BUA].
4. New York has long subscribed to the doctrine of employment at will. See Martin v. N.Y.
Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895) ("[A] general or indefinite hiring is, prima facie, a
hiring at will .... ) (emphasis added)).
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Kodak and its employees. As a former forklift operator opined, "There
were times I wasn't happy with the place .

. .

. But it was a great

company to work for and gave me a good living for a long time."5
Unfortunately, Kodak is now a shell of what it once was, 6 but in

its prime, Kodak earned the trust of its employees through a genuine,
albeit implied, commitment to lifetime employment.' By contrast, a
typical at-will employee enjoys no such guarantee or commitment to
permanence. Perhaps not coincidentally, and despite a robust legal
regime in the United States designed to protect employees from arbitrary employment actions, a significant number of employees do not
trust their employers. A 2016 survey reported in the Harvard Business Review found that only forty-six percent of U.S. employees have
a high amount of trust in their employers.' The study reported that
"too much employee turnover" was one of the major factors contributing to this lack of trust.9 Indeed, empirical research reveals that
employees are less trusting of their employer when the employer does
not offer adequate job security. 0
Employees who trust their employer are generally more productive, effective, and cooperative." Employers thus have a strong incentive to foster trust in their employees, but the at-will employment
doctrine-the default employee-employer relationship in the absence
of an employment contract for a specified duration-may undermine
trust in the employment relationship. Despite extensive scholarship
on the doctrine of at-will employment, an important question remains unanswered: how (if at all) can the law encourage trust between at-will employees and their employers? Importantly, this Note
does not call for a complete end to at-will employment in favor of a
universal just cause system; there are still many benefits that both
parties can derive from the at-will default, and it may, in fact, be the
5.

Irwin, supra note 1.

6. Due in large part because of the failure to keep pace with technology, Kodak filed
a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 in January 2012. Tendayi Viki, On the Fifth Anniversary of Kodak's Bankruptcy, How Can Large Companies Sustain Innovation?, FORBES
(Jan. 19, 2017, 3:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tendayiviki/2017/01/19/on-the-fifthanniversary-of-kodaks-bankruptcy-how-can-large-companies-sustain-innovation/#592e67fb6280
[https://perma.cc/N26Y-QUU2].
7. Thomas A. Kochan, Rebuilding the Social Contract at Work: Lessons from Leading Cases 4 (Inst. for Work and Emp't Research, Working Paper No. WP09, 1999),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edulviewdoc/download?doi=10. 1.1.544.1182&rep=repl&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/P8NX-MSNA].
8. Karyn Twaronite, A Global Survey on the Ambiguous State of Employee Trust,
HARV. Bus. REV. (July 22, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/a-global-survey-on-the-ambiguousstate-of-employee-trust [https://perma.cc/7SAG-UCT6].
9. Id.
10. See discussion infra Section III.B.
11. See discussion infra Section III.B.

20181

JUST CAUSE FOR TRUST

835

proper default in a variety of situations. But the law should do more
to honor the expectations of employees in this otherwise employerdominated employment relationship.
This Note proposes that the at-will presumption should remain
the initial default, but when an employee forms a legitimate expectation of loyalty, the law should no longer consider the employment relationship presumptively at will. As an employment relationship is
essentially contractual, the law should honor the expectations of the
parties as the contract evolves. To determine whether an employee
has a legitimate expectation of loyalty, courts should examine the
following factors: (1) the employee's record of service to the employer;
(2) the employer's investment in the employee; and (3) the length of
the employment relationship. And if a court determines that an employee formed an expectation of loyalty during the course of employment, the employment presumption should shift to a just cause
standard. This solution will not only allow both the employee and the
employer to benefit from the advantages of at-will employment during the initial stages of the employment relationship, but it will also
serve to enhance job security, which will consequently promote trust.
In support of this recommendation, this Note is further divided
into four parts. Part II presents an overview of the employment atwill doctrine and explores the general relationship between trust
and law. Part III analyzes at-will employment in greater depth.
First, Part III examines the concept of employment as a contractual
agreement and considers the effect of employees' expectations. Part
III then analyzes trust between employees and employers in the atwill relationship. In addition, Part III explores proposals that
scholars have previously offered to reform the at-will system. After
establishing that none of the previous ideas adequately encourage
trust, Part IV proposes that although at-will employment should
remain the default presumption at the start of an employment relationship, the law should honor employees' expectations and elevate
certain employee-employer relationships above the at-will presumption when an expectation of loyalty arises. Additionally, Part IV
presents the criteria that a court should examine to determine
whether an employee holds a legitimate expectation of loyalty. Finally, Part IV confronts counterarguments to the proposed solution.
Part V offers a conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
Part II presents the two foundational concepts of this Note. First,
this Part explores the doctrine of employment at will as well as the
statutory and common law exceptions to the doctrine. Second, this
Part examines the relationship between trust and law.

836

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

A.

[Vol. 45:3

The Employment At-Will Doctrine

Employment at will is the default rule in the United States for an
employee-employer relationship in the absence of an express employment contract for a specified duration of time. 2 An employment
agreement that does not state a specified term of employment and
does not limit an employer's ability to terminate an employee is presumptively an at-will agreement.1 3 Unless a limitation is imposed by
statute, common law, or contract, either party in an at-will employment relationship may terminate the relationship at any time, with
or without cause.1 4 The common articulation of the doctrine is that an
at-will employee can be terminated "for good cause, bad cause, or no
cause at all."' 5 Although this articulation appears largely one-sided,
the at-will employee similarly enjoys the freedom to sever the employment relationship for any reason and at any time. Scholars have
roundly criticized the doctrine in calling for change to the default
presumption,' 6 but courts continue to adhere to the basic principle
that the employment relationship is presumptively at will." To be
certain, this presumption is not conclusive and may be overcome by
12. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). At-will employment is
the default rule in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia. Id. § 2.01 cmt. b. Montana is the only state that has statutorily modified the default rule to require "good cause"
terminations. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (2017). This Note will not specifically
address Montana law, other than to acknowledge the exception.
13. RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAw § 2.01 cmt. b; see also McNichols v. Dep't of Transp.,
804 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) ("An at-will employee is defined as one whose
employment is not governed by a written contract for a specific term and who is terminable
at the will of either the employer or the employee.").
14. RESTATEMENT OFEMP'TLAW§ 2.01.
15. E.g., Lauture v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 216 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A]n atwill employee can be fired for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all . . . .").
16. E.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2010) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Just Notice] ("To be sure, for the
last fifty years, employment law scholars have evinced a near consensus that employment
at will . . . ought to be abolished."). See Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At- Will: The ImpendingDeath of a Doctrine, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 653, 687 (2000) ("The future of employmentat-will ... is that it has no future.").
17. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Howard Univ., 839 F. Supp. 2d 268, 281 (D.D.C. 2012) ("It
has long been settled in the District of Columbia that an employer may discharge an atwill employee at any time and for any reason, or for no reason at all." (quoting Adams v.
George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); Burnett v. E. Baton Rouge
Par. Sch. Bd., 99 So. 3d 54, 59 (La. Ct. App. 2012) ("Generally, an employer is at liberty
to dismiss an at-will employee at any time for any reason without incurring liability for
the discharge. In fact, there need be no reason at all for the discharge." (citations omitted)); Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 608 (Tex. 2002)
("[A]bsent a contract, the relationship between an employer and an employee is 'at will,'
meaning that . . . either party may terminate the employment relationship for any reason or no reason at all."); Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 277 P.3d 81, 85 (Wyo. 2012) ("Atwill employment may be terminated by either the employer or the employee at any time
for any or no reason, with no legal consequence.").
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evidence demonstrating that the parties intended to contract for a
definite period of employment. 8 Still, the burden falls squarely on
the employee to rebut the at-will presumption, and as explained in
Section III.A, overcoming this presumption is, without question, a
"heavy burden."
The at-will doctrine has been a foundational principle in U.S. employment law since the late 1800s.2 0 Some scholars argue, however,
that the doctrine arose from a misstatement of the law.2 ' Indeed, U.S.
law was "rather confused" with respect to employment agreements of
indefinite duration throughout the 1800s.2 2 When faced with such an
agreement, "[d]ifferent courts might rule that an identical, indefinite
contract was either presumptively annual, terminable at will or terminable at the end of a payment period." 2 3 Then, in 1877, Horace
Wood authored a treatise in an attempt to alleviate the confusion in
the law. 2 4 Wood wrote: "With us the rule is inflexible, that a general
or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant
seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof."2 Eighteen years later, the New York Court of Appeals adopted this language verbatim in Martin v. New York Life Insurance Co., 26 and by 1930, the at-will employment doctrine was firmly embedded in U.S. law.2 7 Whether Wood's treatise was indeed a
misstatement of the law is entirely irrelevant now because (with the
exception of Montana2 8 ) the at-will employment doctrine has with-

18. Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
19. See discussion infra Section III.A; see also Howard v. Wolff Broad. Corp., 611 So.
2d 307, 311 (Ala. 1992) ("[E]mployees ... bear a heavy burden of proof to establish that an
employment relationship is other that 'at will.' ").
20. Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 67-68 (2000).
21. Id. at 67 ("Wood's Rule, by imposing a blanket presumption that all indefinite
hirings were at will, misstated existing law."). See generally Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1976) (arguing
that the employment at-will rule "was mostly inconsistent with contract doctrine and classical master and servant law").
22. Sanford M. Jacoby, The Durationof Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States and England: An HistoricalAnalysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L.J. 85, 109 (1982).
23. Id.
24. H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (William S.
Hein & Co. 1981) (1877).
25. Id.
26. 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895).
27. See Summers, supra note 20 at 67-68 ("Because of the prestige of the New York
Court of Appeals, this decision gave credibility and dominant authority to the employment
at will doctrine . . . .").
28. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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stood the test of time and remains the default rule in the United
States.
Theoretically, employees can derive a variety of benefits from the
at-will relationship. To begin, at-will employment recognizes the venerable notion that an employee is the "full owner of his labor" and
honors freedom of contract." The at-will default allows for a prospective employee to bargain for the terms and conditions of employment
that he or she considers acceptable.3 0 Consequently, employees will
generally receive higher wages under an at-will employment agreement.31 Moreover, employees may even value the freedom to move
from one job to the next without any restrictions.
In addition, at-will employment constrains the potential for an
employer's abuse of power.3 2 If an employer makes excessive or unfair
demands on its employees, the at-will employee is free to sever, or
threaten to sever, the employment relationship and walk away without any legal repercussions. 3 3 In contrast, a fixed-period employment
arrangement "invites abuse by the employer" because the employer is
"free to demand of the employee whatever services he wants for some
fixed period of time." 3 4 Therefore, at-will employment may serve to
limit the employer's potential for abuse of power.
However, the most significant drawback to the at-will doctrine
may be the fact that an at-will employee can be terminated at the
whim of the employer, at any time and for any reason. Indeed, employees in the United States are more vulnerable to arbitrary termination than in any other developed nation. 3 5 In an effort to remedy
this vulnerability, Congress has enacted numerous statutes to prevent discriminatory employment actions and the common law has
carved out exceptions to the at-will default.
1.

Statutory Exceptions to Employment At Will

Numerous statutes offer some protection against employers that
are otherwise free to terminate at-will employees for any reason. At
29. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 95355 (1984).
30. Id. at 955.
31. Martin Neil Baily, Wages and Employment Under UncertainDemand, 41 REV.
ECON. STUD. 37, 38 (1974) (explaining that an employer "must pay a higher wage if
there is some positive probability of unemployment than it would if employment were
guaranteed").
32. Epstein, supranote 29, at 966.
33. Id. at 966-67.
34. Id. at 966.
35. Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
149, 160 (2005).
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the federal level, Congress has enacted a number of statutes designed
to protect employees from discriminatory employment actions. 3 6 The
most fundamental statutory exception to the at-will doctrine is the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits an employer from terminating (or otherwise discriminating against) an employee on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 3 7 In addition, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits employers from discharging an employee because of age. 3 8 Similarly, the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prevent
employers from discriminating against employees with disabilities. 3 9
And more recently, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008 prohibits the use of genetic testing to influence employment decisions. 4 0 Although this is not an exhaustive list of the statutory protections afforded to employees in an at-will employment relationship,
these examples illustrate that an employer's ability to terminate an
at-will employee is not without limitation.
2.

Common Law Exceptions to Employment At Will

In addition to statutory protections, the common law has carved
out exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. The three main
common law exceptions are: (1) the public policy exception; (2) the
implied contract exception; and (3) the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing exception. 4 ' These exceptions address employee terminations
that technically comply with the at-will employment doctrine but
seem inappropriate or unjust.4 2 The recognition of these exceptions
varies from state to state, and only six states recognize all three exceptions: Alaska, California, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. 43
Yet four states do not recognize any of these three exceptions: Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and Rhode Island. 4 4 The overwhelming ma36. In addition to federal legislation, every state has adopted measures to prohibit
employers from engaging in discriminatory termination behaviors. Kenneth R. Swift, The
Public Policy Exception to Employment At-Will: Time to Retire a Noble Warrior?, 61
MERCER L. REV. 551, 555 n.20 (2010).
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
38. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012).
39. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-718 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
40. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
41. Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 2001, at 3, 4, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/artlfull.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RJB4-MMK2].
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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jority of states thus accept at least one common law exception to the
at-will doctrine.
The most recognized common law exception to at-will employment
prevents an employer from terminating an employee for reasons that
violate well-established public policy of the state. 4 5 California created
the first public policy exception in Petermann v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters.4 6 In Petermann, the plaintiff was terminated by
his employer for giving truthful and correct testimony when his employer instructed him to make false and untrue statements. 47 The
California Court of Appeal conceded that because the plaintiffs employment contract did not specify a term of employment, the employment relationship generally would be "terminable at the will of
either party for any reason whatsoever." 4 8 The court, however, charted new territory by announcing that the right to discharge an employee under such an employment relationship may be limited by
public policy considerations. 4 9 Still, the Petermann court acknowledged that " 'public policy' is inherently not subject to a precise definition,"5 0 and courts have struggled to both define public policy and
determine when an employee's termination violates public policy. 5
The implied contract exception applies when an employer and an
employee form an implied contract despite the lack of an express,
written agreement detailing the employment relationship .51 Under
this exception, an employer's oral or written representations about
job security or procedural actions may create an implied contract. 5 3
45. See Christopher L. Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1583, 1593
(1994). Specifically, forty-three states recognize the public policy exception, making it the
most widely accepted exception to at-will employment. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted
Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn. 1980) (recognizing as contrary to public policy an
employee's termination for reporting employer's violations of a food safety statute); DeRose
v. Putnam Mgmt. Co., 496 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Mass. 1986) ("[A]n at-will employee has a
cause of action for wrongful discharge if the discharge is contrary to public policy");
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that a termination in retaliation for filing a workmen's compensation claim is contrary to public policy).
But see DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253, 1253-54 (Fla. 1980) (declining to recognize an exception to the at-will employment doctrine when employee was terminated for refusing to withdraw a lawsuit against employer); Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc.,
320 S.E.2d 872, 878-79 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting an exception to the at-will presumption when employee was terminated for refusing to commit perjury).
46. 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
47. Id. at 26.
48. Id. at 27 (citations omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Swift, supra note 36, at 557.
52. Muhl, supra note 41, at 7.
53. Id.
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Accordingly, it logically follows that a termination that does not comport with the employer's oral or written representations may constitute a breach of the employment contract. A common situation in
which this exception arises involves employee handbooks that state
employees can only be terminated under specified circumstances, or
"for cause." 5 4 In practice, however, this exception affords little protection to employees because employers can escape contractual liability
by simply including a disclaimer provision in employee handbooks,5 5
and employers are generally not bound by oral representations unless they "result from specific bargaining over job security."56
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception is the "most
significant departure" from the at-will employment doctrine.5 7 Under
this exception, an employer's termination decisions are subject to a
just cause standard, and terminations made in "bad faith" or "motivated by malice" are prohibited.5 8 For example, in K Mart Corp. v.
Ponsock, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that an employee's
termination was a "bad faith discharge" because K Mart terminated
the employee to avoid paying his retirement benefits.5 ' But only a
small minority of states recognize this exception,6 o and those that
have applied the exception have done so quite narrowly.6' Instead of
adopting the express obligation of good faith and fair dealing includ62
ed in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,'
courts have only invoked the good faith and fair dealing exception in the at-will employment context when an employer terminates an employee to avoid
paying the employee's deferred compensation. 6 3 Indeed, no state "has
54. E.g., Shah v. Am. Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983); Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Mich. 1980); Pine River State
Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d
441, 442 (N.Y. 1982).
55.

Summers, supra note 20, at 75.

56.

Sally C. Gertz, At-Will Employment: Origins, Applications, Exceptions and Expan-

sions in the Public Service, 31 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 489, 495 (2008).
57.

SHAWE & ROSENTHAL, EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK

58.

Id.

59.

732 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Nev. 1987).

§

16.03 (2017).

60. The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT'L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/researchllabor-and-employment/at-will-employmentoverview.aspx [https://perma.cc/7VEX-YY4E] (last visited Jan. 1, 2018); see also Monique
C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard: The Covenant of Good Faith and

FairDealing in the Employment Context, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1233, 1259 (1992) (explaining that
only "[flourteen states have allowed an obligation of good faith in some form to restrict the

employer's at will rights").
61.

Rachel Arnow-Richman, Modifying at-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV.

427, 470 (2016) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Modifying].
62.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 205 cmt.

a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

63. Arnow-Richman, Modifying, supra note 61, at 470; see also Rachel ArnowRichman, MainstreamingEmployment Contract Law: The Common Law Case for Reasona-
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adopted the broad definitions of good faith . . . in the context of employment at will."6 4
Despite the numerous federal statutes designed to prevent an employer from terminating an at-will employee for discriminatory reasons, and despite the common law exceptions that courts have carved
out to rectify unjust terminations, employees in the at-will relationship remain vulnerable to no cause, or arbitrary, terminations. Although essential to prevent discrimination, the statutory exceptions
afford no protection for an arbitrary termination action. Moreover,
the common law exceptions "have been so grudgingly applied by most
courts" and amount to "little more than paper shields" against arbitrary termination actions.6 5
Presumably, the law offers these exceptions to curtail opportunistic employer behavior. Absent evidence of bad faith, however, the exceptions offer little security to an at-will employee. But instead of
immediately falling in line with scholars calling for a complete overhaul of the at-will employment doctrine,'6 6 an understanding of the
general relationship between trust and law is necessary to arrive at a
more informed solution.
B.

Trust and Law

In A Cognitive Theory of Trust, Professors Claire Hill and Erin
O'Hara aptly define trust as "a state of mind that enables its possessor to be willing to make herself vulnerable to another-that is,
to rely on another despite a positive risk that the other will act in a
way that can harm the truster." 6 7 Indeed, trust involves an exposure
to opportunistic behavior, but trust also involves confidence: confidence that the trusted party will not act in a way to harm the trusting party, or confidence that the trusted party will adhere to certain
values that will lead the trusting party "to act in the way the trusting person desires."6 8 In short, a trusting party is vulnerable to opportunistic behavior but believes that the trusted party will not behave opportunistically.

ble Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1559-60 (2014) ("The only factual context
in which good faith claims by employees have enjoyed a modicum of success has been
where the plaintiffs termination results in the deprivation of a promised benefit.").
64. Arnow-Richman, Modifying, supra note 61, at 470.
65. Summers, supra note 20, at 77.
66. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
67. Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1717, 1724 (2006).
68. Id. at 1725.
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Certain relationships are prone to undertrust, "where the risks of
trust seem great," or in other words, where vulnerability to opportunistic behavior is too great." In such relationships, the law should
seek to promote trust because the parties are unlikely "to gravitate
toward optimal trust levels on their own."7 0 Yet the goal should not

simply be to blindly maximize trust, but rather to optimize trust, and
optimizing trust involves striking the appropriate balance of trust
and distrust?' Legal scholars traditionally assumed trust and distrust exist on a "unidimensional continuum"; however, under an alternative view, both trust and distrust can simultaneously exist.7 2

And this condition of simultaneous trust and distrust is the most
prevalent for "working relationships in modern organizations."73
But as a preliminary matter, scholars disagree on the ability of
law to promote trust. For example, Professor Larry Ribstein was of
the belief that law could do nothing to encourage trust. 74 In distinguishing between trust and mere reliance, Professor Ribstein
acknowledged that "[t]he law can clearly produce a decision to rely,"
but he refused to accept that law had the ability to effect trust.7 1
Moreover, Professor Ribstein argued that "law actually may undermine trust."7 6 He theorized that the imposition of legal duties de-

signed to encourage trust would give the parties an opportunity "to
get more than they bargained for."7 7 The additional duties intended

to "reduce the parties' vulnerability to the risk of disappointment"
would have the adverse effect of increasing their "vulnerability to op-

69. Id. at 1795.
70. Id. at 1750-51.
71. Id. at 1720.
72. Id. at 1730.
73. Roy J. Lewicki et al., Trust and Distrust: New Relationships and Realities, 23
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 438, 447 (1998).
74. Larry E. Ribstein, Law u. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 576 (2001).
75. Id. at 556. In Law u. Trust, Professor Ribstein used the employee-employer relationship as an example of a relationship in which "[t]he disposition to trust is particularly
important." Id. at 561. He wrote:
If . .. workers are disposed to trust, then there is no need for law. Law may
dispose one party to rely on another because the other is subject to legal constraints. But this has nothing to do with the distinct concept of trust. . . . Legal coercion might be said to cause a disposition to trust that is based on
one's favorable experiences in relying on others. . . . But legal coercion . . . al-

so reduces their ability to learn how others will act when they are not subject
to legal constraints.
Id. at 562-63.
76. Id. at 576.
77. Id.
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portunistic litigation."7 In addition, Professor Ribstein believed that
law would inhibit the "creation of trust."7 9 Like Professors Hill and
O'Hara, he understood that trust requires vulnerability, and "[1]egal
coercion of faithful behavior" would eliminate vulnerability and
thereby prevent the development of trust.so
Many scholars, however, remain optimistic in the law's ability to
foster trust.8 ' Trust involves exposing oneself to a risk of opportunistic behavior, and as Professors Hill and O'Hara explain, "an individual has a maximum level of vulnerability that she is willing to accept, and she is unwilling to make herself more vulnerable than
that."8 2 In other words, when the risk of opportunistic behavior is too
great, an individual simply will not trust. But if an individual perceives the risk to be below the "maximum vulnerability level," then
the individual will be more inclined to trust.8 3 Indeed, people are
more likely to trust when the risk is minimized. 8 4 Law can therefore
promote trust by sufficiently reducing the risk of trusting to a level
that an individual is willing to accept.
Importantly, law should not entirely eliminate the risk of opportunistic behavior when seeking to enhance trust. Professors Hill and
O'Hara argue that individuals should shoulder a "co-pay" to trusting:
"The optimal regime is likely one akin to a 'co-pay' arrangement,
whereby people are largely protected from opportunism but bear
some modest portion of the costs themselves."8 5 By bearing a cost or
co-pay to trusting, people are largely protected from opportunistic
behavior; however, vulnerability is not eliminated altogether.8 6 Because they remain vulnerable to a risk of opportunistic behavior,
people must still gather and process trust-relevant information and
make assessments as to whether trust is appropriate.8 7 In essence,
law can reduce vulnerability enough to encourage interaction, allowing people to acquire the necessary information to determine whether

78. Id.
79. Id. at 576-85.
80. Id. at 580.
81. Hill & O'Hara, supra note 67, at 1752; see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2001); Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1457
(2005).
82. Hill & O'Hara, supra note 67, at 1752.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1753.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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trust is warranted. Therefore, by not entirely eliminating vulnerability, it remains possible for trust-as opposed to mere reliance-to
develop.

III.

ANALYZING THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE: CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES,

TRUST, AND PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED REFORMS
Part III begins with an analysis of the employment relationship
as a contractual agreement and highlights the importance of expec-

tations in contract law. After establishing the benefits of trust between employees and their employers, this Part endeavors to explain the possible reasons for the lack of trust in the relationship.
This Part then considers arguments that scholars have previously
offered to reform the at-will system. Ultimately, this Part concludes
that the previously suggested reforms, while not without merit,
would not sufficiently promote an optimal level of trust in the employment relationship.
A.

ContractualPrinciplesApplicable to Employment Law

'

At its most fundamental level, an employment relationship is a
contractual agreement between employer and employee: the employer promises to pay the employee in exchange for the employee's
work.8" To be certain, employment agreements are treated just as any
other contract.9 0 The at-will employment relationship, even though
terminable for any reason at any time by either party, is a contractual agreement as well.9
The Restatement of Employment Law embraces the contractual

nature of the at-will employment relationship and recognizes that
an "employment relationship is not terminable at will by an employer if .

. other established principles recognized in the general

88.

Id.

89.

19 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS

§

54:1 (4th ed. 2017); see also RESTATEMENT OF

EMP'T LAW § 2.01 cmt. b (Am. LAW INST. 2015) ("At its core, employment is a contractual
relationship.").
90. E.g., Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Wisconsin courts
treat contracts concerning employment like any other contract."); see also Cuellar-Aguilar
v. Deggeller Attractions, Inc., 812 F.3d 614, 619 (8th Cir. 2015) ("Under Arkansas law,
'[t]he [employment] relationship' . . . 'is contractual in nature.' " (alterations in original)
(first quoting ConAgra Foods, Inc. v. Draper, 276 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Ark. 2008); then quoting Turner v. Ark. Ins. Dep't, 297 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2002))); McInerney v. Charter
Golf, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 1347, 1349 (Ill. 1997) ("As with any contract, the terms of an employment contract must be clear and definite and the contract must be supported by consideration." (citations omitted)).
91. Richard Harrison Winters, Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-at-Will
Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196, 197; see also Darlington v. Gen. Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 309
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) ("Every employment relationship is also a contractual relationship.").
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law of contracts limit termination of employment."9 2 The most fundamental principle of contract law is to honor the expectations of the
parties to a contract. 9 3 Indeed, "[r]easonable expectations permeate
contract law." 9 4 Much scholarship has been written on the subject of
reasonable expectations, and this Note will proceed with a brief definition of the concept. First, expectations are the beliefs held by the
parties to a contract with respect to the "understandings, promises,
and obligations" in fulfilling the bargained-for exchange.9 5 They can
arise from an express promise, or they may be implied from "words,
conduct, or setting."96 The concept of expectations thus involves a
"subjective and probabilistic" anticipation of future events.9 7
Reasonableness, on the other hand, is a much more amorphous
concept.98 The concept of reasonableness "is an expression of .. . customs and mores that are themselves complex, variable with time and
place, inconsistent and contradictory."99 Reasonableness is thus highly contextual, but context is only the first step in the analysis.' To
determine whether an expectation is reasonable, "the court filters the
context through norms to reach a conclusion about reasonableness."' 0 ' Norms defining reasonableness may arise from law, professional standards, or societal values. 0 2 Despite contract law's emphasis on ascertaining the "reasonable expectations" of the parties to a
contract, courts appear to place greater emphasis on the "expectations" of the parties than on the "reasonableness" analysis.1 03

RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 2.02(e).
93. See Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1467 (1989) ("[Clourts construing contracts are always attempting to
satisfy 'reasonable expectations.' "); see also 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993). The title of this section-the first
section of this treatise-reads: "The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of
Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises." Id.
94. Jay M. Feinman, Good Faith and Reasonable Expectations, 67 ARK. L. REV. 525,
537 (2014).
95. Id. at 535.
96. Id.
97. Bailey H. Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally Protecting Reasonable Expectations,
32 VAL. U. L. REV. 19, 24 (1997).
98. See 1 CORBIN, supra note 93, § 1.1 ("Reasonableness is no more absolute in character than is justice or morality.").
99. Id.
100. Feinman, supra note 94, at 535-36.
101. Id. at 536.
102. Id.; see also Kuklin, supra note 97, at 24 ("[T]he word 'reasonable' denotes an objective and normative aspect.").
103. Kuklin, supra note 97, at 24. ("In contract law ... 'expectations' appear to be emphasized, not 'reasonable,' since this topic relates to consensual matters between individuals in which the state's interest is primarily to implement private preferences. If the pri92.
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But courts have been quite reluctant to supplant the at-will presumption based on an employee's expectation of loyalty. For example,
in Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., the court applied a bright-line
version of the at-will employment rule and refused to consider the
circumstances of the employment agreement. 0 4 The plaintiffemployee was a consulting engineer who was sought after for employment as a superintendent and engineer by the defendantemployer. 0 5 At the same time, the plaintiff was also negotiating with
a major university for a position as an associate professor. 0 6 After
the university offered him the position, the plaintiff approached the
defendant to discuss his employment options. 0 7 The defendant
agreed to give him "permanent employment" at a specified monthly
salary if he would reject the university's offer, give up his consulting
business, move to the defendant's location, and purchase the departing superintendent's house.' 0 8 The plaintiff agreed to these terms and
accepted the defendant's offer.' 09 Two years later, the defendant terminated the plaintiff, and the plaintiff brought suit, alleging that his
employer "wrongfully, unlawfully and willfully" terminated the employment relationship."1 0
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was an atwill employee and thus found that the plaintiffs claims had no merit."' The court stated that by agreeing to "permanent employment,"
the parties were merely agreeing to an indefinite term of employment." 2 The court further explained that an indefinite term of employment was employment at will.11 3 Without evaluating the facts of
the employment arrangement or the expectations of the parties in
forming the employment agreement, the court mechanically applied
the employment at-will rule to find in favor of the employer.114
Similarly, in Ross v. Montour Railroad Co., the court determined
that the plaintiff failed to overcome the at-will presumption." 5 In
vate preferences are considered unreasonable by outside observers, to a large degree, so be
it.")
104. 266 N.W. 872, 873-78 (Minn. 1936).
105. Id. at 872-73.
106. Id. at 872.
107. Id. at 873.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 876-78.
112. Id. at 873-74.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 516 A.2d 29, 31-32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
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Ross, the plaintiff was a "productive and competent" employee who
worked in the defendant's employ for twenty-two years." 6 He began
as a mechanic and earned several promotions during his career."'
Prior to the end of the employment relationship, the defendant promoted the plaintiff to assistant superintendent, gave him a $3,000
raise, and promised that the position of superintendent would be his
in three to five months." 8 The defendant, however, never promoted
the plaintiff to this promised position. The defendant experienced a
downturn in business, and the plaintiff was "'bumped' back to a position as machinist-welder" shortly before his employment ended."'
In considering whether the employment relationship was at will,
the court stated that "[d]efiniteness is required to overcome the atwill presumption."` 0 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs expectations of continued employment were "vague and conclusary [sic] contentions" that did not reach the requisite level of "definiteness" necessary to rebut the at-will presumption."' Instead, the court held
firm in its determination that the employer never intended the relationship to move beyond the at-will default. 2 2
Likewise, in Yeager v. Harrah's Club, Inc., the court determined
that the plaintiff-employee failed to rebut the at-will presumption.1 2 3
In this case, the plaintiff was terminated after twenty-one years of
continued service to his employer.1 2 4 He began his employment as a
cashier and worked his way up the ranks to become the assistant
general manager of operations. 2 5 Despite many oral assurances that
he would remain employed until his retirement, the plaintiff was
terminated when his employer eliminated his position.'2 6 Two years
after his termination, the plaintiff filed suit against his former employer in Nevada state court. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that the plaintiff failed to
overcome the at-will presumption, and the Supreme Court of Nevada
affirmed. 2 7

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
897 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Nev. 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1098.
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The court found that the only evidence to rebut the at-will presumption came in the form of the plaintiffs "uncorroborated assertions" that the employer made oral assurances of long-term employment.' 28 The court further reasoned that the absence of corroborating
evidence indicating that the employer intended to enter into a longterm agreement with the plaintiff weighed in favor of the employer. 2 9
The dissent, however, offered a sharp criticism of the majority opinion, explaining that a "contract of continued employment" was wellestablished by the plaintiff.1 3 0 According to the dissent, the majority
placed "an unprecedented and unwarranted impediment" on employees who have been wrongfully terminated.131 Moreover, the corroboration requirement, in the dissent's estimation, gave an "undue advantage to employers and treat[ed] employees in an unfair and discriminatory way." 3 2
As this sampling of cases illustrate, courts are reluctant to supplant the at-will presumption despite the employees' legitimate expectations of loyalty. Perhaps the demonstrated unwillingness to
honor this expectation contributes to the lack of trust between at-will
employees and their employers, but it likely does not provide the entire picture. The next Section explores trust in the at-will employment relationship in greater depth.
B.

Trust in the At-Will Employment Relationship

Trust is essential to the employee-employer relationship because
it is directly proportional to employee effectiveness.1 3 3 When employees trust their employer, productivity increases, along with revenue.1 3 4 Perhaps more significantly, a lack of trust negatively affects
employee communication (in both quantity and quality) and cooperation.1 35 In addition, a lack of trust produces a decline in problemsolving and overall performance.1 3 6 Simply put, trusting employees
are better employees, and employers that inspire trust in their em-

128. Id. at 1095.
129. Id. at 1096.
130. Id. at 1099 (Springer, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1098.
132. Id. at 1101.
133. Bird, supra note 35, at 169.
134. Sue Bingham, If Employees Don't Trust You, It's Up to You to Fix It, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Jan. 2, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/if-employees-dont-trust-you-its-up-to-you-to-fix-it
[https://perma.cc/FY5G-8ES6].
135. Sandra L. Robinson & Denise M. Rousseau, Violating the Psychological Contract:
Not the Exception but the Norm, 15 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 245, 255-56 (1994).

136.

Id. at 256.
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ployees have a competitive advantage over those that do not.1 3 7 Accordingly, employers should have a strong interest in promoting a
trusting relationship with their employees. However, less than half of
employees place a high amount of trust in their employers,1 3 8 and as
explained below, the at-will employment relationship is plagued by
undertrust.1 39
Interestingly, research suggests that at-will employees do not fully
understand the ramifications of employment at will.1 40 In one survey
of at-will employees, eighty-three percent of respondents believed
that it was unlawful for an employer to terminate an employee for no
reason.14' But as stated above, the ability for an employer to terminate an employee for "good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all" is the
essence of at-will employment.1 42 Perhaps ignorance is indeed bliss
because employees may likely be "inordinately unsettled and demoralized if they knew the cold hard truth of at-will employment."l43
Still, this fundamental misunderstanding of the default employment
presumption is troubling, and as discussed below, it may account for
the low levels of trust that employees have in their employers.
One scholar explains that even though employees may believe it is
unlawful for an employer to terminate an employee without cause, it
does not necessarily follow that employees believe their employers
will adhere to the just cause standard.1 4 4 Instead, "[e]mployees may
believe that employers act illegally and get away with it-either because they can obscure the truth and manufacture a valid reason for
discharge, or because legal remedies that exist in principle are unavailable or inadequate in practice." 4 5 This explanation shows that
employees do not trust their employers to honor the job security that
they believe the law affords them.
But assume that employees fully understand the nature of at-will
employment. In this scenario, employees realize the ability of their
137. Hill & O'Hara, supra note 67, at 1719; see also John Cook & Toby Wall, New Work
Attitude Measures of Trust, Organizational Commitment and Personal Need NonFulfillment, 53 J. OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOL. 39, 39 (1980) ("[T]rust between individuals and
groups within an organization is a highly important ingredient in the long-term stability of
the organization and the well-being of its members.").
138. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of relationships characterized by undertrust, see Hill & O'Hara,
supra note 67.
140. Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, And Why Does
It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 8-9 (2002).
141. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 119 ex.6.1 (1999).
142. See discussion supra Section II.A.
143. Estlund, supra note 140, at 17-18.
144. Id. at 15.
145. Id.
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employer to make terminations without cause. They understand that
job security is simply not available in an at-will employment relationship. Although the employee's at-will status might be the result
of a negotiated employment agreement, job security remains "the
most important factor in the life of a worker." 4 6 As explained below,
job security is a major factor in promoting trust in the employment
relationship.
A lack of job security, or a lack of trust in employers to honor job
security (even if the belief in job security is mistakenly held), diminishes trust in the employment relationship, and the reverse is also
true: job security encourages trust.1 4 7 An employer's willingness to
take measures to make its employees feel secure in their jobs is "an
outward extension of an organization's commitment to and trust in
its employees."14 8 Consequently, employees who believe that they enjoy stability and security in their position "will reciprocate with high
trust." 4 9 Employees are, in fact, more inclined to trust their employer
when the employer provides "an adequate level of job security." 50 It
thus follows that when employees are not confident in the security of
their jobs, they will be less trusting of their employers than if they
were assured some modicum of job security.
To be certain, at-will employment creates an imbalance of power
that places employees in a disadvantaged position relative to their
employers.' 5 ' Proponents of the employment at-will system highlight
the reciprocal nature of the relationship, but it is at best only nominally reciprocal because most employees generally value their jobs at
a level far greater than employers value their employees' services on
an individual level. Employees find value in their jobs "not only from
wages and benefits but from the satisfaction of needs for security,
sociability, self-respect, and meaning in life." 5 2 Thus, employees un146. John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of
Employment At Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 481 n.64 (1980).
147. See Rosalind Searle et al., Trust in the Employer: The Role of High-Involvement
Work Practices and ProceduralJustice in European Organizations, 22 INT'L. J. HuM. RES.
MGMT. 1069, 1073 (2011). See Dan P. McCauley & Karl W. Kuhnert, A Theoretical Review
and Empirical Investigation of Employee Trust in Management, 16 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 265,
273 (1992) (explaining that employees are more likely to trust their employers when they
are assured of an "adequate level of job security").
148. McCauley & Kuhnert, supra note 147, at 272.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will us. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1404-05 (1967); Timothy J.
Coley, GettingNoticed: Direct and Indirect Power-Allocation in the Contemporary American
Labor Market, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 965, 967 (2010); see also Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of
Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 579, 579-80.
152. Estlund, supra note 140, at 34.
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doubtedly rely on their employers for a myriad of benefits beyond
simply earning a paycheck, and many people allow their work to become part of their "existence and identity." 5 3 Therefore, an employee
suffers far greater repercussions from a severance of the employment
relationship than an employer.1 54 Indeed, "[1]osing one's job has long
been recognized as one of the most stressful and traumatic experiences a person may ever endure."15 5 Moreover, a terminated employee
may experience a higher risk of "depression, alcohol and drug abuse,
and even suicide."15 6 The ramifications of losing a job are staggering,
and employees stand to lose much more than employers as a result of
a severed employment relationship. Indeed, at-will employees are
highly vulnerable to their employers' opportunistic behavior.
Although the exceptions to the at-will doctrine described in Part II
seek to remedy the imbalance of power and reduce employees' vulnerability to opportunistic employer behavior, most employees in the
United States have "only marginal security in their employment" due
to their status as at-will employees.'5 7 Generally, an imbalance of
power results in the weaker party growing distrustful of the stronger
party, unless there is some mechanism or protection in place to encourage trust. And in the employer-dominated at-will employment
relationship, the mechanisms presently in place do not adequately
encourage trust. Therefore, law should do more to encourage trust in
the at-will relationship. The next Section considers previously proposed reforms to the at-will system to determine whether the proposals, if implemented, would promote trust.
C. ProposedReforms to the At-Will System
Because the at-will relationship so strongly favors employers,
some scholars see the default employment rule as a matter of injustice that requires reform.' 58 Scholars have offered two common arguments to reform at-will employment: (1) impose a fiduciary duty of
153.

William B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America:

The Legal and Collective BargainingFramework, 1986 BYU L. REV. 885, 892.
154. Bird, supra note 35, at 162; see also
Tiger: A Critique of the Model Employment
852 (1994) ("The human tragedy wrought by
able. . . . It is therefore not surprising that
trauma when they are discharged.").
155.

Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless
Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849,
such wrongful terminations is immeasurmany employees suffer severe emotional

Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will Em-

ployment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 63 (2008).
156. John Joseph Peregoy & Connie T. Schliebner, Long-Term Unemployment: Effects
and CounselingInterventions, 13 INT'L J. FOR ADVANCEMENT COUNSELING 193, 193 (1990).

157.

Coley, supra note 151, at 967.

158. E.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust DischargeReform Heads
Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 67 (1988).
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loyalty on employers; and (2) change the default presumption to a
just cause standard for termination. But as discussed below, neither
reform, if implemented, would sufficiently optimize trust in the employment relationship.
1.

Imposing a FiduciaryDuty of Loyalty on Employers

Under conventional wisdom, fiduciary relationships are "broad
commands against selfish behavior that lead to obligations to act
with the utmost good faith and loyalty." 59 The suggestion to impose a
fiduciary obligation is thus often proposed as a means to inspire trust
in relationships where it otherwise does not exist.' Not surprisingly,
several scholars have advocated for the need to impose fiduciary duties upon employers to reform the at-will employment relationship.''
Although courts have "virtually unanimously" imposed a duty of loyalty on employees, 6 2 employers do not owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty
to their employees.1 6 3 To be certain, it seems largely one-sided for the
law to hold at-will employees to a fiduciary standard while simultaneously affording employers the opportunity to terminate such employees for no cause whatsoever. But what remains unclear is whether the imposition of fiduciary duties on employers would encourage
trust in the relationship.
159. Kelli A. Alces, Larry Ribstein'sFiduciary Duties, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1765, 1766.
160. See id. at 1767.
161. See Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819,
854 (2017) ("[I]t makes sense to characterize the employment relationship as a whole as
fiduciary, and the employer as a fiduciary of its employees."); Marleen A. O'Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring the Fiduciary/ContractLaw Distinction to Enforce Implicit Employment Agreements, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 219
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
162. Marian K. Riedy & Kim Sperduto, At-Will Fiduciaries?The Anomalies of a "Duty
of Loyalty" in the Twenty-First Century, 93 NEB. L. REV. 267, 268 (2014); see also Michael
Selmi, The Restatement's Supersized Duty of Loyalty Provision, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 395, 402 (2012) ("[Slome, though not many, courts ... hold that at-will employees owe no
duty to their employer, while many other courts impose only a limited duty . . . on at-will
employees . . . ."). Some courts have adopted the approach taken by the Restatement (Third)
of Agency, which defines agency as a fiduciary relationship and characterizes all employment relationships as agency relationships. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the Workplace, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1257 (2015) (explaining that the Restatement (Third) of Agency "characterizes all employees as agents and thus subjects them
all to a fiduciary duty of loyalty"). Yet other courts have adopted a more limited view, as
articulated in the Restatement of Employment Law, restricting the applicability of the fiduciary duty of loyalty to employees who are "in a position of trust and confidence with their
employer[s]." RESTATEMENT OF EMP'T LAW § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
163. Catherine Fisk & Adam Barry, Contingent Loyalty and Restricted Exit: Commentary on the Restatement of Employment Law, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 413, 419 (2012)
("The employer owes no duty of loyalty to the employee and is free to pursue its selfinterest by firing him to hire another for a lower wage or for better skills.").
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In Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, Professor Matthew
Bodie argues that "[t]he employment relationship is best understood as a mutual set of fiduciary relationships between employer
and employee."164 Professor Bodie relies on the characteristics of
discretion and vulnerability in the employment relationship to support the imposition of a fiduciary duty on employers.' 6 5 He contends
that a fiduciary's discretion over a beneficiary "forms the cornerstone of many fiduciary theories."1 6 6 In addition, Professor Bodie
asserts that a beneficiary's vulnerability to discretion "triggers" the
need for fiduciary duties. 6
Employers certainly exercise discretion over the livelihoods of
their employees, and employees are largely vulnerable to an opportunistic use of that discretion. 6 8 A fiduciary duty of loyalty, however, demands unselfishness 6 9 and would thus require employers to
stop pursuing their own interests in running the business effectively to consider their employees' interests. But the very nature of the
at-will presumption allows employers to act in their self-interest at
the expense of their employees.' 70 Moreover, a fiduciary duty of loyalty would be too great of a burden to place on employers as it
would potentially result in massive inefficiencies.1
Further, if the law were to impose a fiduciary duty of loyalty on
employers, then any employee could sue his or her employer for a
breach of fiduciary duty, and employers could be punished for
breaching their duty. This would eliminate the "co-pay" that is necessary to trust and would likely prevent the development of trust.
Employees may question whether their employers are truly committed to their continued employment or simply acting to avoid legal
punishment.' 7 2 Therefore, this solution would likely not serve to
promote trust in the at-will employment relationship.

164. Bodie, supra note 161, at 862.
165. Id. at 855-59.
166. Id. at 856.
167. Id. at 858.
168. See discussion supra Section III.B.
169. Alces, supra note 159, at 1768.
170. Fisk & Barry, supra note 163, at 419 ("The employer ...
is free to pursue its
self-interest by firing [the employee] to hire another for a lower wage or for better
skills.").
171. See Epstein, supra note 29, at 951 (arguing that at-will employment represents
"the efficient solution to the employment relation").
172. See Ribstein, supranote 74, at 575.
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2. Just Cause as the Default Standard
Dating back to the 1960s, scholars have called for an abandonment of the at-will system in favor of a just cause requirement for
termination.1 7 3 Although the demand for a universal just cause system is not without merit, the scholarship fails to account for how
changing the default presumption would affect trust in the employment relationship. The shift to just cause would certainly enhance job
security, and as explained in Section III.B, job security is a major factor contributing to trust between employees and their employers.1 74
But similar to the imposition of fiduciary duties, this change may not
promote trust because employees would be skeptical of whether their
employers are truly committing to their continued employment or
simply abiding by a legal mandate. Moreover, this too would eliminate the trust co-pay by practically eliminating employees' vulnerability to opportunistic terminations.
IV.

REFORMING

AT-WILL

EMPLOYMENT TO ENCOURAGE TRUST

Trust in the employee-employer relationship is suffering. By definition, the at-will presumption allows employers to act in their selfinterest at the expense of their employees. Because employees value
their jobs so highly, the central issue with trust is that employees are
largely vulnerable to employers exercising their legally protected
right to terminate at-will employees in an opportunistic manner. As
long as an employee termination does not contravene one of the exceptions outlined in Section II.A, employers are free to sever the employment relationship for any reason. But the statutory exceptions to
the at-will doctrine only serve to curtail discriminatory or bad cause
terminations, and the "paper shield" common law exceptions offer
little (if any) protection against arbitrary termination actions. Moreover, the previously offered arguments advanced by scholars to reform the at-will system would not sufficiently remedy the lack of
trust in the employment relationship.
At present, the trust co-pay is likely too high for employees under
the at-will employment doctrine. Employee vulnerability is simply
too great under the current system. To be certain, employees must
work to earn a living, so the lack of trust is not displayed through an

173. Blades, supra note 151, at 1410; Estlund, supra note 140, at 30; Peter Stone Partee, Reversing the Presumption of Employment At Will, 44 VAND. L. REV. 689, 708-11
(1991); Porter, supra note 155, at 84; Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 121 (2002).
174. See discussion supra Section III.B.
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unwillingness to work.' 7 5 Instead, the effectiveness of the employer's
business suffers when trust is absent.' 7 6 Despite an employer's incentive to promote trust in its employees, the employment relationship
remains fraught with undertrust. And because relationships characterized by undertrust are unlikely to gravitate to an optimal level, 7 7
the law should play a role in encouraging trust.
To reduce vulnerability to opportunistic behavior and optimize
trust in the employee-employer relationship, the law should elevate
certain relationships above this initial presumption. The at-will presumption should remain the default, but the law should honor an
employee's expectation of loyalty, and once this expectation exists,
the employment relationship should no longer be presumptively at

will.
A.

At-Will Employment as the InitialPresumption

The at-will presumption should remain the initial default for an
employment relationship. Retaining this default presumption at the
beginning stages of employment is beneficial to both the employer
and employee. As explained in Section II.A, the at-will presumption
honors freedom of contract, and employees will likely earn a higher
wage under this default. Moreover, an employee retains the flexibility and freedom to change employment if the employee values such
freedom or determines that the position is ill-suited to the employee's
particular skill set. In addition, this initial presumption honors the
venerable notion that an employee is the "full owner of his labor." 7 8
As for the employer, the initial at-will presumption allows an opportunity to get acquainted with its employees to determine if a
commitment to continued employment is warranted. If the employer
decides to commit to continued employment, then the employer can
take the necessary steps to do so. But as an initial presumption, the
employer is free to terminate the relationship or retain the employee
in its present position without investing in the employee's continued
employment. Of course, the employer bears the risk of losing talented
employees to an employer that is willing to commit to a more secure
employment arrangement.

175. See FRANK TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) ("We have become a
nation of employees. We are dependent upon others for our means of livelihood, and most
of our people have become completely dependent upon wages.").
176. See discussion supra Section III.B.
177. See discussion supra Section II.B.
178. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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Honoring the Expectation of Loyalty

As the employment relationship is fundamentally a contractual
agreement, the law should do more to honor employee expectations.
One of the expectations that arises in an employment relationship
over time is the expectation of loyalty. An expectation of loyalty describes the belief that as long as the employee is upholding his or her
end of the employment agreement,' 7 9 the employer will continue to
honor the agreement and will not opportunistically sever the relationship. This expectation of loyalty differs from a fiduciary duty of
loyalty because it is not a legal mandate to refrain from selfish behavior and place the interests of another ahead of oneself. Rather, it
is an expectation that the employment relationship will continue in
good faith. And the expectation, when legitimately held, should supplant the at-will presumption in favor of a just cause termination
standard.
Courts can ascertain the existence of an expectation of loyalty by
examining three factors: (1) the employee's record of service to the
employer; (2) the employer's investment in the employee; and (3) the
length of the employment relationship. If an employee forms an expectation of loyalty during the course of employment, the employment relationship should no longer be presumptively at will.
With respect to the first factor, an employee's record must demonstrate quality service for the expectation to be legitimately held by
the employee. If an employee has not performed to a satisfactory level, then it is unreasonable to expect loyalty from an employer in the
form of continued employment. Indeed, an employee who consistently
underperforms may be subject to termination for just cause, making
this analysis entirely moot.
The employer must also have invested in the employee's continued
employment for an expectation of loyalty to be formed. Whether
through promotion or advanced training, an employer must demonstrate a commitment to continued employment beyond the investment necessary to train the employee to perform in an initial position. Training opportunities represent an employer's investment in
the employee in both time and money. Additionally, and to borrow an
idea from the military, promotions are generally not a reward for
past performance, but rather an investment in the potential of the
employee to serve in a higher position with greater responsibility.'s
From the perspective of the employer, both training and promotions
179. For an employee, this would involve, among other things, performing reasonably
competent work.
180. U.S. AIR FORCE, PAMPHLET 36-2506, YOU AND YOUR PROMOTIONS-THE AIR FORCE
OFFICER PROMOTION PROGRAM § 11 (1997).
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represent investments in the employee's future potential and signal
an expectation that the employment relationship will continue.
Therefore, employees may form an expectation of loyalty based on the
employer's investment in their continued employment.
In addition to quality service and employer investment, the length
of employment also forms an expectation of loyalty. An employee
cannot form an expectation of loyalty from the first day of employment (unless specifically bargained for), but it is important that the
period of service not be fixed to a minimum length. An adequate
length of time will largely be determined by the facts and circumstances of the employment relationship. But an employee who has
remained employed for years, however, may form an expectation of
loyalty, even if the other factors are not met.
By applying this analysis to ascertain whether an employee had
an expectation of loyalty, the law will encourage trust by reducing
an employee's vulnerability to arbitrary terminations. For those
employment relationships in which an employee formed a reasonable expectation of loyalty, employees will be less vulnerable to arbitrary and opportunistic terminations because the law will no longer
consider that relationship presumptively at will. Instead, employers
will be required to show just cause for a termination. Honoring the
expectation of loyalty will reduce vulnerability to arbitrary terminations, thereby enhancing job security and promoting a more trusting relationship.
C.

Counterarguments

Critics of this proposal will quickly point out that the expectation
of loyalty cannot be a reasonable expectation because it is contrary to
the at-will doctrine that has been embedded in U.S. law for over 100
years; therefore, the law should not honor this ostensibly unreasonable expectation. But the law has previously honored a party's legitimate expectations when they contravened long-standing doctrine. In
Javins v. First National Realty Corp., the plaintiffs were apartment
tenants who refused to pay rent because their landlord failed to
maintain the premises.' 8' In essence, the tenants formed an erroneous belief with respect to the duties of their landlord. The court explained that, traditionally, a lease was "the conveyance of an interest
in land" and noted that according to common law rules of property, a
landlord was under no obligation to continue to make the conditions
of the leased premises habitable. 8 2 Nevertheless, the court deter181. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
182. Id. at 1074, 1076 ("[Under] the old common law rule ... the lessor is not obligated
to repair unless he covenants to do so in the written lease contract.").
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mined that the legitimate expectations of the tenants warranted legal protection.'8 3
To support its holding, the court turned to the landlord-tenant relationship and explained that the "inequality in bargaining power
between landlord and tenant" provided "compelling reasons" for the
law to protect the tenants' expectations.' 8 4 The court noted that tenants have "very little leverage" in the relationship, and emphasized
that landlords often "place tenants in a take it or leave it situation."
This inequality analysis led the Javins court to determine
that it was necessary to protect the legitimate, albeit erroneous, expectations of the apartment tenants, despite the long-standing common law doctrine with respect to property leases.
The employment at-will relationship has many similarities with
the landlord-tenant relationship, and like tenants, employees' legitimate expectations are equally deserving of legal protection. Although
an expectation of loyalty may contravene the doctrine of at-will employment, the Javins case illustrates that an expectation that does
not comport with long-standing common law doctrine may still be an
expectation deserving of legal protection.
Other critics may suggest that this solution will be ineffective because, even though it shifts the presumption from at will to just
cause, it only protects the relatively few employees who would be able
to prove that they were terminated for purely arbitrary reasons. 8 6
Under a just cause presumption, the burden still falls on the terminated employee "to prove a fact-intensive question on an issue on
which the employer holds all of the relevant information." 8 7 Terminated employees would thus likely find it difficult to prove the absence of any cause for their termination.'88
This counterargument, however, fails to account for the expressive
value law. Aside from imposing legal sanctions, the law influences
behavior "because it signals patterns of public approval."' 89 If the law
requires employers to provide justification for their termination actions, then they should realize that arbitrary terminations contravene societal values. Accordingly, shifting the at-will presumption to

183. Id. at 1079.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Arnow-Richman, Just Notice, supra note 16, at 6-7.
187. Id. at 20.
188. See id. at 20-21.
189. Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV.
339, 373 (2000).
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just cause should have the effect of aligning employer behavior with
public values.
Still, other critics will rely on the empirical research in Section
III.B to offer the counterargument that, at present, employees believe
that just cause is the standard and still place little trust in their employers. They would question how offering a solution that only
changes the default presumption for some employees could promote
trust. But if the law required justification for terminations, employees would presumably witness fewer arbitrary terminations. If the
frequency of arbitrary terminations decreased, employees may begin
to gradually feel more secure in their positions. Moreover, the justifications for terminations made for good cause would indicate what
conduct would lead to termination. Employees would likely feel more
confident in the security of their jobs knowing the type of conduct
that warrants termination.
V.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the days of Kodak-like job security are behind us. After
all, the common employer practice to offer stable employment with
"cradle-to-grave benefits" that was prevalent in the twentieth century is no longer a reality. But the lack of job security under the at-will
doctrine today should not doom the employment relationship to one
of distrust and skepticism. Indeed, the law can, and should, be
properly used to reduce employee vulnerability to opportunistic termination, thereby encouraging trust between employees and employers. As the employment relationship is a contractual agreement, the
law should honor employee expectations and afford an enhanced level
of job security for employees who form a legitimate expectation of
loyalty. This solution allows employees and employers to enjoy the
benefits of the at-will presumption initially, while elevating certain
relationships to a just cause standard. Ultimately, this solution offers
just cause for trust in the employment at-will relationship.

